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INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND CIVIL RICO: AFTER
SCHEIDLER V. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
WOMEN, INC., RICO'S SCOPE AND REMEDIES
REQUIRE REEVALUATION
Daniel Z. Herbst'
In its analysis of the availability of injunctive relief under the civil
provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of
1970 (RICO),' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
[T]wo separate episodes from the history of civil RICO's
legislative passage convince us that ... [the arguments that the
court could grant the injunctive relief] do not reflect Congress'
intent in section 1964. First, the House rejected an amendment,
described as "an additional civil remedy," which would
expressly permit private parties to sue for injunctive relief
under section 1964(a). Second, in the very next year after
RICO's enactment, Congress refused to enact a bill to amend
section 1964 and give private plaintiffs injunctive relief .... The
clear message from the legislative history is that, in considering
civil RICO, Congress was repeatedly presented with the
opportunity expressly to include a provision permitting private
plaintiffs to secure injunctive relief. On each occasion,
Congress rejected the addition of any such provision.2
Congress enacted the RICO as part of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970 (OCCA),3 in response to public outcry and several
government studies revealing pervasive infiltration of the legitimate
business community by the mafia and other organized crime syndicates.4
RICO proscribes broad patterns of racketeering activities historically
associated with organized crime and empowers federal prosecutors to
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2005, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to thank Thomas Patton, Nathan Huff, Shayna Bloom, and
Amy Yaroslow for their advice, support, and editing assistance.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
2. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1986).
3. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
4. Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 213, 247-50 (1984). OCCA described the pervasive danger of an economic effect of
organized crime, defining the purpose of the Act to be "the eradication of organized crime
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in [the] evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." 84 Stat. at
922-23.
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enforce the provision with powerful criminal penalties and civil equitable
remedies.5 Additionally, the Act creates a private civil RICO cause of
action, permitting individuals to seek damages for injuries to business or
property resulting from racketeering.6 OCCA's scheme mandates that
courts interpret the RICO statute "liberally . . . to effectuate its remedial
purposes."7 The private civil remedy coupled with a broad definition of
racketeering and liberal construction resulted in an explosion of civil
RICO lawsuits in the mid-1980s.i Since then, private plaintiffs
increasingly have brought actions under RICO in areas not typically
associated with organized crime. 9 Today, private racketeering suits are
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The four main acts prohibited under RICO are generally:
investment of income derived from racketeering activity; acquisition of any interest in an
enterprise engaged in racketeering; participation in any enterprise engaged in racketeering
activity; and conspiracy to violate the previous provisions. Id. § 1962. Section 1961
defined racketeering activity as "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled
substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act).
. chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year" or
any act indictable under a long list of federal titles. Id. § 1961(1)(A), (B). All of the
predicate acts that could lead to a charge of "racketeering" were existing federal crimes or
state common law crimes. Id. § 1961(l)(B). RICO provisions allow federal prosecutors to
seek fines, imprisonment, criminal forfeiture of assets, and restraining orders or
injunctions. Id. § 1963. The provision also granted extensive civil penalties that
prosecutors could pursue. Id. § 1964(a).
6. Id. § 1964(c). The statute states:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, except that no person may rely upon any
conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the
preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is
criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of
limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.
Id. The threefold damages provision is called a treble damages clause, and was adopted
by the House of Representatives in a late amendment to mirror the private civil action of
federal antitrust law under the Clayton Act. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A
DEFINITIVE GUIDE § 2 (2d ed. 2000).
7. § 904(a), 84 Stat. at 947.
8. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5, 9
(1989). The Chief Justice noted that from 1983 through 1988, civil RICO suits have
increased more than eightfold. Id.; see also Elizabeth Anne Fuerstman, Trying (Quasi)
Criminal Cases in Civil Courts: The Need for Constitutional Safeguards in Civil RICO
Litigation, 24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 169, 169-70 (1991). Since 1985, plaintiffs have
filed approximately 1,000 private civil RICO actions a year in federal courts. Id. at 170
n.5; see also JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 1.
9. Rehnquist, supra note 8. at 9. The Chief Justice suggested that most civil RICO
actions being filed have no relation to organized crime. Id. ("Virtually everyone who has
addressed the question agrees that civil RICO is now being used in ways that Congress
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more prevalent than criminal racketeering prosecutions." The escalation
of private lawsuits has evoked substantial debate, and several Supreme
Court decisions have surfaced regarding the scope and availability of
remedies under civil RICO."
Because federal courts have afforded significant deference to liberal
interpretations, plaintiffs not only have applied RICO in creative ways,
but also have sought new remedies." One particular remedy sought by
plaintiffs is injunctive relief."3 Injunctions attract civil RICO plaintiffs
who claim that their businesses or properties cannot receive full
compensation from monetary rewards. 4 However, injunctions also
never intended when it enacted the statute in 1970."). Racketeering has the potential to
link legitimate businesses with organized crime. See id.; see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 526 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting); John L. Koenig, Comment, What
Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court Takes the Racketeering Requirement
Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 829 n.34 (1986).
10. Fuerstman, supra note 8, at 170-71; see also Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 9
(explaining that most civil RICO actions "are garden-variety fraud" that should be
handled by state courts).
11. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. t70, 183-85 (1993) (suggesting that the
boundaries of congressional purpose limit the liberal construction clause); Sedima, 473
U.S. at 481 (indicating that to establish a RICO cause of action a plaintiff merely must
satisfy the predicate act requirement and elements of the offense); JOSEPH, supra note 6, §
1 (explaining that a great amount of law exists debating various RICO issues of "standing,
injury and damages, equitable relief, causation, and a variety of pleading and practice
issues"). But see Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler 1I), 537 U.S. 393, 397
(2003) (limiting the predicate racketeering act of extortion).
12. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (NOW), 267 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir.
2001) (explaining that liberal construction allows for federal courts to exercise injunctive
power in private civil actions, authority explicitly granted for federal prosecutions),
overruled by 537 U.S. 393 (2003); see also G. Robert Blakely & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable
Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology v. Wollersheim: Will Civil
RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 556-
57 (1987) (arguing that liberal interpretation requires RICO to be read to allow private
injunctive relief).
13. See, e.g., NOW, 267 F.3d at 693 (seeking injunctive relief to stop a coalition of
abortion protesters from closing clinics); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d
1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 1986) (seeking injunctive relief to prevent dissemination of religious
material); Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. Channel Fueling Service, Inc. (In re Fredeman Litig.), 843
F.2d 821, 822 (5th Cir. 1988) (seeking injunctive relief to freeze assets of an allegedly
fraudulent company); see also JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 20(A).
14. See Blakely & Cessar, supra note 12 (arguing that rejecting injunctive relief limits
the use of civil RICO to white collar crime); Glenn Israel, Comment, Taming the Green
Marketing Monster: National Standards for Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 303, 314-17 (1993) (stating that civil RICO, with the availability of
injunctive relief, may be a potential weapon against deceptive environmental marketing);
Geri J. Yonover, Fighting Fire with Fire: Civil RICO and Anti-abortion Activists, 12
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 153, 155 (1990) (proposing civil RICO as a solution to anti-
abortion protesters shutting down clinics).
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reveal the greatest potential dangers of RICO.' 5 RICO plaintiffs have
used this remedy to force large settlements, drive legitimate competitors
out of business, and prevent political organizations from carrying out
group activities.
6
The Supreme Court encountered one such plaintiff in Scheidler v.
National Organization of Women, Inc. (Scheidler II), its most recent
opinion regarding civil RICO's scope." In both trips to the Supreme
Court, Scheidler revealed the potential for civil RICO to infringe on
constitutionally guaranteed rights when applied to an organization
15. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 10 (suggesting that the recent application of
civil RICO reveals the inherent problems with private enforcement of RICO because
plaintiffs' interests lack prosecutorial discretion); Koenig, supra note 9, at 823-24. Many
injunctive relief opponents such as businesses, First Amendment watchdogs, and
federalists express significant concerns about the deviance that the availability of
injunctions under RICO may cause. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Individual Rights in Support of the
Petitioners, Scheidler II (Nos. 01-1118, 01-1119); Brief for the States of Alabama,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Scheidler II (Nos. 01-1118,
01-1119) (suggesting that RICO throws off the balance of federalism because the broad
statute usurps state judicial authority in areas of law traditionally reserved for states);
Craig M. Bradley, NOW v. Scheidler: RICO Meets the First Amendment, 1994 SUP. CT.
REV. 129, 134-35 [hereinafter First Amendment] (suggesting that RICO application to
political activists implicates First Amendment issues); Craig M. Bradley, When Is Political
Protest a RICO Violation?, 39 TRIAL 72 (2003) [hereinafter Political Protest] (insisting that
RICO's elements still lack clear understanding); Charles Levendosky, Protecting Anti-
abortion Protests, Protects All, CASPER STAR-TRIB. (Wyoming), Mar. 2, 2003, reprinted in
COMMENTARY ON FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES, FIRST AMENDMENT CYBER-TRIB., at
http://fact.trib.com/lst.lev.protestnoextort.html (last visited July 14, 2004) (suggesting that
civil RICO, as broadly applied, threatens to violate First Amendment freedoms); MAYER,
BROWN, ROWE & MAW, LLP, SUPREME COURT DOCKET REPORT, at
http://www.appellate.net/docketreports/sc20558099.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2004)
[hereinafter DOCKET REPORT] (suggesting that the question of injunctive relief is of
particular interest to many businesses because the remedy provides a dangerous weapon
to plaintiffs to force settlements).
16. See, e.g., NOW, 267 F.3d at 693 (upholding the district court's injunctive order
against national anti-abortion action network); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1345, 1357 (3d Cir. 1989) (upholding injunction against anti-
abortion protesters); DOCKET REPORT, supra note 15 (noting that injunction is a
dangerous weapon for civil litigants to challenge business competitors); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 1549, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4076, 4083-84 (dissenting Representatives
Abner Mikva, William F. Ryan, and John Conyers, Jr. opposed the bill with the House
amendment to add the civil provision to RICO). The dissenters suggested that the new
civil RICO provision invited angry competitors to harass innocent businessmen with
protracted federal litigation and negative publicity, in order to destroy the competitor's
business. Id. at 4083.
17. Scheidler 11, 537 U.S at 394-400. Scheidler came before the Supreme Court twice.
The first will be referred to as Scheidler I. 510 U.S. 249 (1994). The second, the most
recent trip to the Supreme Court, is the case to which this note primarily refers, and will
be described as Scheidler II.
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voicing a political opinion."' Ultimately, Scheidler II failed to address the
constitutional issues raised by RICO's broad application and left
unresolved the applicability of injunctive relief.'9  While the Court
dismissed the National Organization of Women's (NOW) claim against
2aeanti-abortion protesters , some experts suggested that the expansion of
civil RICO to protest groups continued.2  As a result, civil RICO still
contains perpetual interpretation problems and constitutional questions
that likely will return to the Supreme Court.22
18. See Daniel Lucero et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV 1211, 1262-63, 1270 (discussing how injunctive relief raises debate regarding
violations of the First Amendment); Political Protest, supra note 15, at 72 (suggesting that
RICO has the potential for infringing on First Amendment freedoms); Levendosky, supra
note 15 (suggesting that private civil RICO actions against protesters may chill freedom of
speech and association).
19. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 27-32 Scheidler H1 (No. 01-1118) (stating the
one issue as whether the district court complied with the First Amendment standards
mandated by NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, but not on the First Amendment issue, addressing: first, whether
petitioners committed extortion under the Hobbs Act; and second, whether federal courts
can grant private litigants injunctive relief under the private civil RICO provision.
Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 397.
20. Id.at410-11.
21. See Political Protest, supra note 15, at 74 (suggesting that other avenues of
litigating against abortion protesters are available, such as through states with less strict
definitions of extortion or through other provisions of the Hobbs Act, including violent
coercion); Levendosky, supra note 15 (suggesting that the Patriot Act of 2001, a predicate
act under the RICO scheme, will be a future issue for the Court to address). The recent
strengthening of federal criminal laws against terrorism may raise concerns over potential
civil liberties violations under RICO. Id. RICO incorporates provisions of the Patriot Act
of 2001, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), 2332b(g)(5)(B) (2001), enacted to provide government with
appropriate tools to prevent terrorism. Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2002). The Act
provides that "'[r]acketeering activity' means ... any act that is indictable under any
provision listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B)." 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The U.S. Code defines
"[t]he 'Federal crime of terrorism' . .. as an offense that ... is calculated to influence or
affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against
government conduct" and is a violation of several specified criminal acts. Id. §
2332b(g)(5)(B). The Patriot Act scheme defines domestic terrorism as:
[A]cts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States... intended ... to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; ... to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or... to affect
the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping
and ... occur primarily within the ... United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (Supp. 2001). Under the current Court's broad definition of RICO,
isolated actions of national groups protesting government activity, or of individuals
involved in the protest, may fall under the predicate acts of "terrorism" by "intimidating
local business" or "coercing" government officials into action, and may be subject to civil
injunction at the hands of a private RICO action. See Levendosky, supra note 15.
22. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. 229, 251 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the statute may be unconstitutionally vague); Political Protest, supra note
15, at 74; Levendosky, supra note 15.
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This Comment examines the competing interpretations of civil RICO's
elements and remedies after Scheidler. First, this Comment discusses the
statutory scheme and elements of civil RICO. Next, this Comment
reviews the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of racketeering, which
contributed to RICO's expansive application. Then, this Comment
highlights the circuit split over the availability of civil injunctive relief to
private litigants. Next, this Comment details the Supreme Court's most
recent analysis of civil RICO in Scheidler II, its shortcomings that result
in constitutional and practical enforcement issues, and the current state
of civil RICO. Finally, this Comment argues that the Supreme Court
should construe civil RICO to bar private injunctive relief for both
statutory and policy reasons. Ultimately this Comment concludes that
Congress must amend RICO's private civil provision to serve RICO's
initial purpose and to cure constitutional flaws.
I. THE RICO STATUTE AND THE CONUNDRUM OF PRIVATE INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF: COURTS ANALYZE THE TENSION BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
A. The Scheme of Civil RICO and the Liberal Interpretation Clause
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) of
1970,23 enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
created the federal crime of racketeering.24 Its purpose was to eradicate
organized crime from the legitimate business community. 25  Due to
concern over its constitutional soundness and practical function,
Congress did not direct the Act's prohibitions specifically at the mafia,
26but instead targeted racketeering patterns. To this end, Congressdefined "racketeering activity" by incorporating into its definition
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2001).
24. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
25. 84 Stat. at 922-23. The Act responded to public outcry that originated with media
reports on the mafia in national publications. Bradley, supra note 4, at 247-54. As a
result, the President and Congress ordered federally appointed commissions to conduct
research; the commissions subsequently issued a series of reports. Id.
26. See Koenig, supra note 9, at 830-31 (explaining that when drafting RICO,
Congress did not seek to define organized crime or attach a specific connection to it, but
to create a "functional legal concept"). To maintain RICO's constitutionality, Congress
refrained from barring membership in the mafia, which could have violated freedom of
association under the First Amendment. Curtis Roggow, Note, Of Rum, Rights, and
RICO: Are Plaintiffs Intoxicated with the Power of Civil RICO? What Is Falling Victim to
the Statute?, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 577, 581-82 (1991). The legislative history of the bill
reveals that Senate debate concerning the overbreadth of the Act actually may have led to
a broader definition of RICO. Paul A. Batista & Mark S. Rhodes, CIVIL RICO PRACTICE
MANUAL § 2.13 (Supp. No. 2 1996).
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numerous predicate offenses chargeable under state and federal law that
had long been associated with organized crime syndicates.27
RICO § 1962 classifies racketeering activities in four ways: first, using
or investing income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to
acquire an interest in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce;28
second, acquiring or maintaining an interest or control of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity affecting interstate commerce;
29
third, operating, conducting, or participating in an enterprise affecting
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity;"' and,
finally, conspiring to participate in any of these activities.
From these four offenses, two elements in addition to the predicate
acts themselves are essential to establish a RICO violation: a "pattern of
racketeering" and an "enterprise. ' '32 Section 1961 defines a pattern as
"two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten
years ... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.""
Congress defined an enterprise as "includ[ing] any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.
3 4
The Supreme Court subsequently expanded this definition to include
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a). The definition states:
"Racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene
matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in
section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
Id. The definition also includes any act that is indictable under an extensive list of federal
provisions, most under Titles 18 and 29. Id. Originally mail, wire, and securities fraud
were among the predicate acts. See id. §§ 1961, 1962(a). In 1995, Congress amended §
1964(c) to limit plaintiffs from basing RICO actions solely on securities fraud, unless the
defendant's fraudulent conduct had previously resulted in a criminal conviction. Pub. L.
No. 104-67, sec. 107, § 1964(c), 109 Stat. 737 (1995). Congress included this amendment
with reforms to securities fraud litigation, set forth in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995. Id. Congress inserted the USA Patriot Act of 2001 as a RICO
predicate offense. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 813, 115 Stat. 272, 382 (2001).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
29. Id. § 1962(b).
30. Id. § 1962(c).
31. Id. § 1962(d).
32. Id. § 1962.
33. Id. § 1961(5). The ten-year tolling excludes any period of imprisonment. Id.
34. Id. § 1961(4).
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legitimate businesses as well as associations that lack clear economic
motives, such as protesters."
Once the prosecutor establishes the elements of a RICO offense, there
are a broad range of criminal and civil penalties available to enforce the
RICO scheme.36 For example, § 1963 allows for imprisonment up to
twenty years, fines, criminal forfeiture of assets, and restraining orders.37
Congress also provided federal prosecutors the option to seek civil
injunctions and other equitable remedies to "prevent and restrain
violations of § 1962." 38
In addition to its sweeping criminal provisions and civil enforcement
remedies, RICO also includes a provision encouraging private citizens to
assist the government in the eradication of organized crime." This
"private attorneys general" provision allows a civil litigant to bring a
RICO cause of action against a defendant in federal court for an injury to
business or property. 4 To satisfy the elements of a civil action, RICO
plaintiffs must establish an injury to business or property, caused by the
defendant's violation of one of the four racketeering causes of action in §
1962.4 ' The civil clause specifically provides for the remedies of treble
damages suffered, reasonable attorney fees, and court costs. 42  The
private civil provision, however, fails to stipulate whether individual
plaintiffs, like federal prosecutors, may seek injunctive relief.4 1
35. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler 1), 510 U.S. 249, 256-62 (1994).
There is no requirement that a racketeering enterprise or the racketeering predicate acts
be motivated by economic interests. Id. The term "enterprise" in RICO is not limited to
illegitimate enterprises. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 578, 585-87, 593 (1981).
36. See § 1963. The scheme allowed the Department of Justice to significantly
expand its enforcement regime against organized crime. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 263-
64.
37. § 1963(a)-(d).
38. Id. § 1964(a).
39. Id. § 1964(c); see also supra note 6. Congress intended the civil provision to
promote the Act's purpose of eradicating organized crime by filling "gaps" in
enforcement. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 514 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
40. § 1964(c). The civil provision stipulates that the plaintiff's injury must be to
"business or property." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. Section 1964(a) provides various injunctive remedial powers to federal courts
including ordering divestment or dissolution of an organization. Id. § 1964(a). However,
the private civil provision was a later amendment that included a clause-specific remedy of
treble damages and attorneys' fees. Id. § 1964(c); H. REP. No. 91-1549, at 4034 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4034; see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim,
796 F.2d 1076, 1082-89 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the private civil provision was
added later and should be read as a separate cause of action with its own defined remedy).
1132 [Vol. 53:1125
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The original Senate bill did not include the civil action," but the House
made an "eleventh-hour addition" to include this cause of action.4' The
House fashioned the private civil cause of action and treble damages
remedy after the Clayton Act.46  House proponents of the RICO civil
action expected that the lower burden of proof in civil actions and the
possibility of large damage awards would encourage parties to assist in
the fight against organized crime.4 ' The enticement proved effective, as
the numbers of RICO private actions increased dramatically in the mid-
1980s, as predicate offenses under RICO were broadened to include
wire, mail, and securities fraud.46
However, due to OCCA's liberal construction clause 49 and functional
approach to tackling organized crime,5" the statute provides plaintiffs
with an avenue to bring actions in the federal courts against defendants
who are not associated with organized crime.5 Furthermore, most RICO
actions assert violations traditionally within the jurisdiction of state
courts. 2 The treble damages remedy in the civil provision draws many of
44. H. REP. No. 91-1549, at 4034, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007,4034.
45. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 2.
46. Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27); see
also § 15(a); JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 2. Because RICO's private civil provision was
modeled after the Clayton Act, many courts look to the antitrust predecessor and its case
history for direction when interpreting civil RICO. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240-41 (1987). One commentator noted that "[t]he antitrust laws
provided the precedent for using civil remedies to fulfill RICO's economic goals in the
fight against racketeering." See JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 2; Koenig, supra note 9, at 832.
However, some courts reject strict reliance on the Clayton Act to aid in RICO
interpretation. See, e.g., Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (NOW), 267 F.3d 687,
698-700 (7th Cir. 2001), overruled by 537 U.S. 393 (2003).
47. Koenig, supra note 9, at 832. But see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
501 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. See Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. CORP.,
BANKING AND Bus. L. REP. 55-56: Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 9 (noting that civil RICO
filings increased 800% from 1983 to 1988, totaling nearly 1,000 cases during 1988);
Fuerstman, supra note 8, at 169-70; see also supra note 27 (noting RICO amendments
limiting the predicate act of securities fraud).
49. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,
947 (1970) (stating that "[t]he provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes").
50. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 526 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. Koenig, supra note 9, at 821-23.
52. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 9. Many experts and judges also argue that
RICO contributed to a growing and disturbing trend towards the expansion of federal
criminal law. See, e.g., Sedimna, 473 U.S. at 501-22 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Congress never intended to create such a dramatic shift in federal power); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Center for Individual Rights at 2-22. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women,
Inc. (Scheidler II), 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (Nos. 01-1118, 01-1119); Bradley, supra note 4, at
265-66. Criminal law was traditionally a matter reserved for the states; however, the body
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these plaintiffs, who would otherwise file state claims, in growing
numbers to the federal courts." Plaintiffs have alleged racketeering
claims for a wide range of "racketeering activities," often predicated on
criminal mail or wire fraud, state extortion laws, or securities fraud. 4
This growth is evidenced by the fact that in the past fifteen years,
plaintiffs brought far more RICO lawsuits against legitimate businesses
and organizations than against traditional criminal organizations.
Many courts have struggled to comply with Congress' mandate to
liberally construe the Act in light of its recent applications far outside its
stated purpose . The Supreme Court has given much deference to
liberal interpretations of the Act and consequently, its opinions
reviewing the RICO statute are overtly cautious so as not to overstep the
boundaries of judicial review.57  As a result, the application of RICO
continues to extend to broad areas of traditional state law and criminal
law, without clear court direction or congressional clarification.-
of federal criminal law has expanded to tackle specialized problems of federal concern.
Bradley, supra note 4, at 214-16. Because the traditional purpose of federal criminal law is
"to supplement the criminal law of the state by protecting federal interests," when
congressional lawmaking begins to supplant state police power, it threatens to violate the
constitutional balance of federalism. Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Individual Rights
at 2-6, Scheidler 11 (Nos. 01-1118, 01-1119).
53. See Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 9.
54. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (explaining that widespread application to
businesses was a result of including mail and wire fraud under the predicate acts for
RICO); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981) (extending RICO
provisions to legitimate enterprises); David Manogue, Liability for General Business
Fraud: Putting a Contract Out on RICO Treble Damages, 45 U. PITr. L. REV. 481, 482
(1984) (arguing that the novel federal cause of action with treble damages for those
injured in "garden variety business fraud" misses the intended targets of the act);
Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 9; see also supra note 27 (noting the amendments to the
securities fraud predicate act under the civil provision).
55. See discussion supra notes 9, 10.
56. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1993) (explaining that the
boundaries of congressional purpose limit the liberal construction clause); see also
JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 3 ("There is always a tension between a liberal construction of a
statute and a tendency to overextend it to accomplish ends that the statute was never
designed to achieve."); Fuerstman, supra note 8, at 169-70.
57. See Nat'l Org. for Women. Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler 1), 510 U.S. 249, 252 (1994)
(rejecting limitations that are at odds with the statutory language).
58. See Koenig, supra note 9, at 833-38, 867-68.
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B. The Court Rejects Limits to Civil RICO, Allowing for Expanded
Application
1. Sedima and Northwestern Bell: The Courts Eliminate Limitations
on the Broad Racketeering Requirement
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.'9 significantly expanded the scope of
civil RICO.60 Prior to Sedima, several district courts attempted to curb
the expansion of civil RICO and the significant growth of federal claims
by reading special standing and injury requirements into the statute.' In
Sedima, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal
of an action by a Belgian corporation against a New York exporter under
RICO for the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud.6 2 The court held that
RICO required both a racketeering injury and a prior conviction under
the criminal statute 3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Justice White, writing for
the majority, rejected both the prior criminal conviction and the
racketeering injury restrictions imposed by the circuit court. The Court
determined that standing under civil RICO required only a satisfaction
59. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Sedima was a controversial five-to-four decision that
spanned traditional lines of Court separation. Compare id. at 490-500 (holding that the
text of civil RICO and the liberal interpretation clause cannot be limited by legislative
history or Court interpretation: a pattern of racketeering is merely the commission of two
predicate acts), with id. at 500-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (determining that Congress
intended for plaintiffs to first establish a pattern of racketeering, not simply two acts
alone).
60. See id. at 500-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Koenig, supra note 9, at 821
(discussing how Sedima rejected court-imposed limitations on civil RICO and gave full
credit to the liberal interpretation clause); David Kurzweil, Criminal and Civil RICO:
Traditional Canons of Statutory Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30
COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBs. 41, 71-72 (1996) (explaining that Sedima emphasized that
liberal interpretation is more important in the civil context than in the criminal context).
61. John J. Lulejian, Comment, Making Sense of the Kaleidoscope of Patterns: A
Practitioner's Guide to Understanding the Third Circuit's Interpretation of Civil RICO's
"Pattern of Racketeering Activity," 69 TEMP. L. REV. 413, 425 (1996). Federal courts have
imposed three types of limitations on the standing requirement for RICO. Some have
required the civil RICO plaintiff to establish a defendant's connection with organized
crime. See, e.g., Noonan v. Granville-Smith, Jr., 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp 256, 260 (E.D. La.
1981). Other courts have required a particular "racketeering injury" beyond injury to
property from the predicate acts. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511. 516 (2d
Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 922 (1985). Finally, others have required the defendant to
have a prior criminal conviction under RICO. See Sedima, S.P.R.L., Inc. v. Imrex Co., 741
F.2d 482, 492, 502-03 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring "racketeering injury" and a prior conviction
to establish a civil RICO cause of action), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
62. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 484, 494.
63. Id. at 494.
64. Id. at 488-96.
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of the predicate elements.1 5 The majority also endorsed a broad reading
of RICO, supported by the liberal interpretation clause, and warned
against future judicial efforts to limit the statute upon evidence of
practicality or congressional intent.66 The Court, however, expressed
concern over the "extraordinary" application of RICO.67  The Court
suggested that a plausible judicial restriction would constitute higher
scrutiny of the pattern of racketeering activity element, and suggested a
"continuity plus relationship test" requiring more than simply two acts.
Justice Marshall's dissent gave a narrower reading of the statute.
Like Justice White, he was concerned with the growing application of
RICO, although his main criticism was that its current use marked the
federalization of broad areas of state common law.7 Justice Marshall
rejected Justice White's broad interpretation of the predicate acts of §
1962.' Instead, he asserted that the civil provision was not intended to
prohibit predicate racketeering acts alone, but also patterns of
65. Id. at 496.
66. Id. at 497-500. The Court stated that, "It is true that private civil actions under
the statute are being brought almost solely against such defendants, rather than against the
archetypical, intimidating mobster. Yet this defect.., is inherent in the statute as written,
and its correction must lie with Congress." Id. at 499. Justice White was concerned over
judicial activism overstepping the threshold of judicial review to change the statute as
written by Congress. See id.
67. Id. at 500.
68. Id. at 496 & n.14.
69. Id. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall suggested that the legislative
history shows that Congress never intended for civil RICO to drastically change the
landscape of federal jurisdiction and litigation. Id. at 507 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall suggested that a broad reading would upset the federal balance of power
between the inherent police power of the states and the constitutionally enumerated
powers of Congress, though this issue was not before the Court in Sedirna. Id. at 504
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(outlining the Court's current interpretation of basic principles of federalism that limit
Congress' power to proscribe in areas historically reserved to the states when no clear
connection exists to an enumerated power in the Constitution); accord United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). When Congress legislates, it must do so pursuant to an
enumerated grant; if the action is too overreaching, it may infringe on the reserved
authority of states. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-10 (rejecting
congressional legislation because of a tenuous connection to the grant to regulate
interstate commerce clause); accord Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-64. Justice Marshall suggested
a narrower interpretation of civil RICO that ensured RICO would stay within these
constitutional constraints. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 507 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Congress simply does not act in this way when it intends to effect fundamental changes
in the structure of federal law."). Justice Scalia reiterated Marshall's criticism in
Northwestern Bell, suggesting that the extensive federal criminal and civil penalties require
more certainty to withstand a constitutional challenge. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co.. 492 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
71. Sedirna, 473 U.S. at 510-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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racketeering that have economic effects on other businesses.12 Thus, to
establish a violation of § 1962-as required in the civil provision-Justice
Marshall asserted that plaintiffs must show a pattern of racketeering
activity and demonstrate one of the four predicate acts. 73  The slim
victory of the broader reading afforded by Justice White led to a
continued expansive application of civil RICO.74
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,7 the Supreme Court
attempted to resolve the question Justice White raised in Sedima
regarding the required relationship between the predicate acts and a
pattern of racketeering elements.76 The question arose when the Eighth
Circuit determined that a defendant telephone company's fraudulent
ongoing price-fixing was a single "scheme" and therefore was insufficient
to establish the required pattern under civil RICO.77 Upon a grant of
certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected barriers to civil RICO imposed by
the court of appeals, much like it had done in Sedima.4
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan relied on RICO's statutory
language and liberal interpretation clause to conclude that Congress
intended a flexible understanding of a pattern of racketeering.79 Justice
Brennan expanded the "continuity plus relationship" test by requiring
that a plaintiff establish a connection between the defendant's two
predicate racketeering acts, which likely would result in a continuation of
the racketeering activity ... The Court noted that multiple illegal schemes
may prove helpful for factual analysis in determining the required nexus,
but that two acts alone could establish a RICO violation.81
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion agreed that the Eighth Circuit
incorrectly inserted a new requirement, and that the courts should not
abuse judicial power by reading in statutory requirements not supported
72. Id. at 508-09.
73. Id. Like Justice White's interpretation, Justice Marshall's reading suggested that
judicial review required the Court to read the statute as Congress intended. Id. at 508
(Marshall, J., dissenting). To avoid rewriting the statute from the bench, Justice Marshall
suggested that the broad language must be read to require a pattern of racketeering and
not simply the acts themselves in order to maintain RICO's constitutionality and prevent
pervasive changes in the governmental structure. Id. at 508-09.
74. See Koenig, supra note 9, at 855-64.
75. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
76. Id. at 232.
77. Id. at 236-37. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that a
pattern of racketeering requires multiple racketeering "schemes." Id. at 234-35.
78. Id. at 236.
79. Id. at 239.
80. Id. at 240-42.
81. Id. at 242-50.
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by the text." However, Justice Scalia suggested that the majority did
little to clarify the meaning of the ambiguous statute.83 He expressed
disdain over the statutory scheme, reiterating Justice Marshall's concerns
about federalization of state common law and the revolution of• • • 84
litigation. Justice Scalia concluded that the vagueness of the statute,
which contained broad criminal and civil applications, may make it
susceptible to future constitutional challenges. Ultimately, while the
majority required some connection between predicate acts in order to
constitute a pattern of racketeering, its failure to establish a clear test
resulted in competing interpretations among the federal circuits
•86
regarding the requirement.
82. Id. at 256 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 255 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 255-56 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated:
No constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present case, and so
that issue is not before us. That the highest Court in the land has been unable to
derive from this statute anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for
the day when that challenge is presented.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia suggests that the vagueness of the private civil
provision raises federalism issues with regard to the extent of a federal court's power to
hear RICO claims and Congress' ability to implicate such diverse offenses. See id. at 251-
52 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the broad federal criminal statute may be
unconstitutionally vague); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (condemning the majority's broad reading of RICO language as
broadly extending its application to areas reserved to states). Because RICO includes
such severe criminal penalties and civil rewards, and because its application is so broad
and uncertain, the statutory scheme may violate constitutional federalism principles. See
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Bradley, supra note 4, at 265-66. Two Supreme Court developments may strengthen
future challenges to RICO. First, the extension of civil RICO in Scheidler I to non-
economic enterprises without a direct link to interstate commerce may lend support to this
challenge. Stephen E. Oestreicher, Jr., Scheidler Meets Morrison (At the Entrance to a
Health Clinic), 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 693, 707 (2002). Second, the Supreme Court's
"New Federalism" signaled a trend toward narrower interpretation of the commerce
clause against broad federal criminal legislation, and may lend itself to narrower scrutiny
of the RICO scheme. See id. at 695-96. The result may be closer scrutiny of federal
statutes, particularly when extended to areas indirectly related to interstate commerce. See
id. at 696. With RICO no longer tied to economic motivation and a Court more willing to
scrutinize congressional statutes, Congress may not be able to establish a connection
between civil RICO's broad scope and its justifiable purpose. See id. at 724.
86. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § I I(D)(2) (stating that "[a] concrete definition for
precisely what activity will constitute a 'pattern' for the purposes of the RICO statute has
eluded the federal courts") (citing U.S. Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d
1261 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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2. The Courts Give the Enterprise Requirement a Broad Reading:
RICO Expands to Non-economically Motivated Enterprises
The Court also has allowed for great expansion of civil RICO claims in
the enterprise element.87 The first three prohibited acts under RICO §
1962 include the term "enterprise.""" The first two subsections proscribe
investing in or acquiring an interest in an enterprise, while the third and
fourth subsections prohibit those engaged in an enterprise from
conducting it in a manner that constitutes a pattern of racketeering or
conspiracy to violate RICO's provisions. 9 Congress' use of the term
"includes" to preface the definition of enterprise affords federal courts
broad discretion in defining the term9 Strengthened by the liberally
constructed provision, courts have rejected limitations to suits against
alleged enterprises, regardless of the nature of their association with
criminals, economic motivations, or national interests. 9'
In United States v. Turkette,92 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the dismissal of a RICO action by the First Circuit. ' The First
Circuit had dismissed a RICO action and held that in order to establish a
claim under § 1962(c) and (d), the defendant must engage in an illegal or
94illegitimate enterprise. Justice White wrote for the majority and
reversed the decision, holding that the term "enterprise" applies to both
legitimate and illegitimate organizations9  The opinion reiterated the
distinction between an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering, stating
that an enterprise was "an entity separate and distinct from the pattern
of activity in which it engages., 96 The majority established a test for
87. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler I), 510 U.S. 249.252 (1994)
(rejecting court limitations preventing non-economically motivated enterprises from
qualifying under RICO); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) (rejecting
court limitations preventing legitimate enterprises to qualify under civil RICO).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (2000).
89. Id. § 1962(c)-(d).
90. Scheidler 1, 510 U.S. at 256-61.
91. See id. at 252-53; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579-80.
92. 452 U.S. 576 (t981).
93. Id. at 578.
94. Id. at 578-80. The Court Appeals for the First Circuit held that because the action
was against a legitimate enterprise, the government failed to meet the elements of a RICO
claim against the defendant. Id. at 579-80. The RICO claim was predicated upon §
1962(d), and the district court determined that the defendants conspired to commit
multiple predicate acts under § 1961 through an enterprise. Id. at 578-79. The defendant
introduced evidence that they were engaged in a legitimate business, were not infiltrated
by an illegitimate enterprise, and therefore, could not be convicted under RICO. Id. at
579-80. The First Circuit agreed with the defendant's argument and reversed, dismissing
the claim. Id.
95. Id. at 579-80.
96. Id. at 583.
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courts to measure an enterprise, requiring an ongoing structure and
evidence of functioning as a unit. 97 While straightforward on its face,
many federal courts have struggled to determine the extent of structure
that an "association in fact" must have to constitute an enterprise s By
allowing legitimate organizations to satisfy RICO's enterprise
requirement, Turkette opened the door to increased civil litigation.9
Years later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Scheidler I again
to interpret the enterprise requirement."" To resolve a split among
federal courts of appeals, the Court addressed whether an enterprise
required economic motivation.10 ' In Scheidler 1, NOW and several other
women's health centers sued a coalition of anti-abortion groups under
civil RICO.1 2  These groups included the Pro-Life Action Network
(PLAN) and various associated individuals.11 3 The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants participated in a racketeering enterprise aimed at shutting
down abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity under §
1962(c) and were involved in a conspiracy to commit these acts under §
1962(d)."" The complaint averred that the defendants operated an
enterprise that conspired to commit, and did commit, multiple acts of the
predicate offense of criminal extortion.""1
97. Id.
98. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 11(B)(1). An "associat[ion] in fact" is included on the list
of terms that encompass an enterprise in the RICO definitions section. 18 U.S.C. §
1961(4) (2000).
99. See Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 9 (discussing the increase of civil RICO actions
flooding the federal courts with no connection to organized crime).
100. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler I), 510 U.S. 249, 252 (1994).
101. Id. at 255. Before Scheidler I, the Second and Eighth Circuits required some
financial or economic motivation to establish an enterprise under RICO. See, e.g., United
States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42,
53 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 65 (2d Cir. 1983). Conversely, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not require economic motivation to satisfy the
enterprise requirement. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1350
(3d Cir. 1989).
102. Scheidler I, 510 U.S. at 252.
103. Id. The complaint cited the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) organization as
well as several of its members and organizers, including Joseph Scheidler, Andrew
Scholberg, and Timothy Murphy. Id. at 252 n.l.
104. Id. at 252-54.
105. Id. The amended complaint alleged that defendants "conspired to use threatened
or actual force, violence, or fear to induce the clinic employees, doctors, and patients to
give up their jobs, give up their economic right to practice medicine, and give up their right
to obtain medical services at the clinics." Id. at 253. To satisfy the predicate act
requirement, the plaintiffs alleged extortion under the federal Hobbs Act, Illinois state
extortion law, and the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 252-53. The federal district court
dismissed the Sherman Antitrust claim because of the political, non-economic nature of its
contentions. Id. at 254.
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The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the statute
required some profit-generating purpose to constitute a RICO claim.'6
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal by
adopting the Second Circuit's analysis of an economic enterprise analysis
in United States v. IViC."'7 In doing so, the court rejected the analysis of
the Third Circuit's holding in Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle,"11
which did not require an economic motive."9 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split at the early pleading stage of
the case.""
The Court, in a unanimous decision, overruled the Seventh Circuit and
held that the broad language of the statute did not require an economic
motive to establish an enterprise under the predicate acts of RICO." In
the Court's opinion, Justice Rehnquist explained that a plain reading of
the statute revealed it was not limited to an economic motive." 2 The
Court reasoned that an enterprise could affect interstate commerce
without necessarily seeking profit."3  The Court also suggested that
106. Nat'l. Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 941 (N.D. II1. 1991),
affd, 968 F.2d 612 (1992), rev'd, 510 U.S. 249 (1994). The court determined that PLAN
was a not-for-profit entity operating with voluntary member contributions and failed to
meet the economic or profit-generating requirement of an enterprise under the statute.
Id.
107. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
108. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989).
109. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 627-30 (7th Cir. 1992). The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined the economic motive issue as a case
of first impression for the Circuit. Id. at 626. The court analyzed the circuit split among
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 1988), the Second
Circuit in Ivic, 700 F.2d at 59-65, and the Third Circuit's interpretation in Northeast
Women's Center, 868 F.2d at 1349-50. Id. Ultimately, the court adopted the reasoning of
Ivic because of its reliance on the legislative history and careful analysis of RICO's use of
enterprise in the first two offenses (§ 1962(a), (b)) and in the third offense (§ 1962(c)). Id.
at 627-29. The Ivic court had followed the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of RICO to
require an economic motive for an enterprise under all of RICO's offenses in § 1962(c).
Ivic, 700 F.2d at 65. The Second Circuit had reasoned that RICO's legislative history
targeted "corruption [in] commerce and trade," and, therefore, the term enterprise in
RICO offenses limited to commercial organizations. Id. at 63. Consequently, because
RICO § 1962(c) likely would not adopt a different meaning of enterprise and was qualified
by "affecting interstate or foreign commerce," it also should be bound by an economic
requirement. Id. at 60, 65.
110. Scheidlerl, 510 U.S. at 255.
111. Id. at 252, 260. Professor Craig Bradley suggests that because removing the
economic barrier to RICO allows application to protest groups, it "may... have been the
most controversial unanimous decision by the Supreme Court since Brown v. Board of
Education." First Amendment, supra note 15, at 130.
112. Scheidler 1, 510 U.S. at 256-57.
113. Id. at 257-58.
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courts should place less emphasis on RICO's legislative history and more
on the text.'"
4
To voice his concern and quell fears of potential First Amendment
violations, Justice Souter authored a concurring opinion.' 5  Justice
Souter supported the outcome, but assured RICO defendants that the
opinion did not prevent the raising of First Amendment defenses." 6 He
explained that RICO was limited by the Court's First Amendment
interpretation in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware."' He reassured those
concerned about application of RICO to protesters that under the Hobbs
Act or RICO's "somewhat elastic ... predicate acts," defendants still are
afforded the full protection of the First Amendment."" Even with this
114. Id. at 260-61 (suggesting the legislative history is often a "thin reed" for
interpreting the language of a federal statute).
115. Id. at 263 (Souter, J., concurring); First Amendment, supra note 15, at 135.
116. Scheidler 1, 510 U.S. at 264 (Souter, J., concurring).
117. Id. (noting that "a state common-law prohibition on malicious interference with
business could not . . . be constitutionally applied to a civil rights boycott of white
merchants"); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). In Claiborne
Hardware, the Supreme Court overruled an injunction and damages against civil rights
organizations that boycotted white businesses in Mississippi. Id. at 889-92, 915, 934.
White merchants brought an action against the organization for malicious interference
with business, illegal boycotts, and antitrust violations, which were sustained by the
Mississippi Supreme Court. Id. at 889-92. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens reversed
the Mississippi Supreme Court decision, holding that the impassioned speeches by
organizers of the boycott activity were not violent, and, therefore, constitutionally
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 913-15. Even if the merchants could prove
interference with business, it was questionable whether they could collect or enforce an
injunction against activity protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 928-29.
118. Scheidler 1, 510 U.S. at 264 (Souter, J.. concurring). Justice Souter's concurrence
suggested that application of RICO to non-economically motivated groups would not
provide a sufficient First Amendment check of advocacy groups. Id. at 263-64. After
Scheidler 1, many commentators feared that civil RICO would be used to chill political
activism and would cause a decline in issue advocacy. See, e.g., Peter Burke, Note,
Application of RICO to Political Protest Activity: An Analogy to the Antitrust Laws. 12 J.L.
& POL. 573, 602-03 (1996): Brian J. Murray, Protesters, Extortion, and Coercion:
Preventing RICO from Chilling First Amendment Freedoms, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
691, 739-59 (1999); Alexander M. Parker, Stretching RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45
DUKE L.J. 819, 819 (1996); Jaime 1. Roth, Comment, Reptiles in the Weeds: Civil RICO vs.
the First Amendment in the Animal Rights Debate, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 467, 468 (2002).
Even after Justice Souter's assurance in Scheidler 1, the Supreme Court chose not to
address the nationwide injunction or implication of political activists in Scheidler II.
Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler II), 537 U.S. 393, 397 (2003). The
injunction, which the Seventh Circuit upheld, forbade the anti-abortion coalition's political
activities on private property. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (NOW), 267
F.3d 687, 701-06 (7th Cir. 2001), overruled by 537 U.S. 393 (2003). Although these
activities are not absolutely protected speech, the threat of potential treble damages and
injunctions against activist groups who employ civil disobedience may chill protected
speech and expression that falls within the scope of the First Amendment. John P. Barry,
Note, When Protesters Become "Racketeers, " RICO Runs Afoul of the First Amendment,
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assurance, the Court's broad interpretation of RICO's enterprise
requirement, taken to its logical extreme, may encompass several types
of protest activities."9
C. The Private Injunctive Relief Interpretation Conundrum: 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c) and the Construction of an Ambiguous Provision
In accord with the Supreme Court's extension of RICO beyond
traditional patterns of racketeering and into the realm of non-economic
enterprises, private plaintiffs also have sought to extend RICO's remedy
provisions."" Rather than challenging the court-imposed limits on the
Act, such plaintiffs have sought to add a remedy that Congress expressly
omitted, namely injunctive relief.'2 ' Generally, federal courts permit
injunctive relief under pendant state claims brought with RICO claims
that expressly provide for specific injunctive remedies.112  However,
circuits differ over the availability of injunctive relief under the federal
scheme.12 In Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit gave the first federal appellate ruling on
the issue of injunctive relief and rejected its availability to private
plaintiffs.
1 24
64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 899, 909-16 (1990). RICO has been criticized in several ways for
chilling free speech. First, the threat of prosecution may prevent groups from organizing
peaceful protests for threat that petty offenses will be RICO violations. See id. at 915-16
(suggesting this may be prior restraint on speech). Second, because RICO is prosecuted
by private parties who stand to benefit from the civil suit and lack prosecutorial discretion,
plaintiffs may single out certain viewpoints and direct the statute's provision at particular
expressive content. See id. at 909-11.
119. See First Amendment, supra note 15, at 130; see discussion supra note 118.
120. See, e.g., NOW, 267 F.3d at 693; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d
1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 1986).
121. See Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1084-85 (noting that the Senate limited injunctive
remedies to §§ 1964(a), (b), and (d)). The Senate developed the statute and the House
adopted the private remedy. Id. at 1084. Representative Steiger, proposed an amendment
to add injunctive relief; however, the provision was not included in the final bill. Id.
122. See, e.g., Duct-O-Wire Co. v. U.S. Crane, Inc. 31 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1994)
(upholding a preliminary injunction under the state tortious interference claim); Northeast
Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1356 (3d Cir. 1989) (awarding injunctive
relief under pendant state law claim); see also JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 20.
123. Compare Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1076 (barring injunctive relief to private
plaintiffs), and Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. Channel Fueling Serv. (In re Fredeman Litig.), 843
F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1988) (concluding the court had no power to issue injunctive relief), with
NOW, 267 F.3d at 693 (upholding the district court's injunctive order against national anti-
abortion action network).
124. 796 F.2d 1076, 1076 (barring injunctive relief to private plaintiffs under civil
RICO): Dixie Carriers, 843 F.2d at 828, 830 (concluding that injunctive relief was
unavailable to private plaintiffs under RICO).
2004] 11,43
Catholic University Law Review
In Wollersheim, the Church of Scientology brought an action against a
church splinter group under RICO, seeking damages and an injunction. 21
The church alleged that the defendants stole and illegally disseminated
valuable spiritual materials to organize a rival church. 26 The district
court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the splinter church to
cease dissemination of the information. 27  The plaintiffs claimed
Congress granted equitable power to federal courts under RICO §
1964(a) in federal civil prosecutions that could also extend to private
actions.128 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument and reversed, holding
that the exclusive remedy for private civil actions was treble damages.1
2
9
The court reasoned that federal courts do not have inherent injunctive
powers without congressional authority. 30  It determined that the
inclusion of the specific remedy of treble damages, while silent on the
issue of injunctive relief, "logically carrie[d] the negative implication that
no other remedy was intended to be conferred on private plaintiffs."''
Analyzing civil RICO's legislative history, the court focused on the fact
that a proposed amendment to include injunctive damages was
withdrawn to "carefully explore the potential consequences that [the] ...
new remedy might have."'32  The court also noted that the Supreme
Court had rejected private injunctive relief under the Clayton Act's
private enforcement provision.'33 Because Congress modeled the RICO
treble damages clause on the Clayton Act's private damages clause,
courts should not grant private plaintiffs injunctive relief.3 4
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court's doctrine
"sharply limits" implied remedies and causes of action not expressly
provided for by statute.3
125. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1077-79.
126. Id. at 1078.
127. Id. at 1079.
128. Id. at 1083.
129. Id. at 1088-89.
130. Id. at 1088; see also 31A AM. JUR. 2D Extortion § 180 (2002).
131. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1083.
132. Id. at 1086.
133. Id. at 1087 (noting that injunctive relief is available to private plaintiffs under § 16
of the Clayton Act, but that RICO had no similar separate provision); see also Paine
Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471 (1917) (barring injunctive relief under the parallel §
4 of the Clayton Act); accord Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 70-71 (1904).
134. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1087.
135. Id. at 1087-88; see also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 19 (1979) ("[1It is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading
others into it."); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-78 (1979) (holding
that a particular violation of the Securities Exchange Act regulations did not create a
private cause of action). The Wollersheim court also reasoned that where Congress gives
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Although other circuits have discussed the issue in dicta or generally
paid deference to the opinion, no circuit definitively embraced injunctive
relief as a RICO remedy until National Organization for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler.16 The Seventh Circuit was the first to extend injunctive relief
to private plaintiffs under RICO claims.' On remand from Scheidler I, a
jury held that the anti-abortion coalition operated an enterprise that
committed multiple acts of extortion under the Hobbs Act and Illinois
state law, sufficient to create a pattern of racketeering under RICO.""
Accompanying the jury-imposed damage award, the district court issued
a nationwide injunction barring the coalition, and those acting in concert,
from all named activities.'39
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, finding that
injunctive relief was available to private plaintiffs under RICO. 4 The
court reasoned that the grant of injunctive power for government actions
in § 1964(a) provided courts with the power to issue injunctions for
private plaintiffs.' 41 Judge Wood explained that the liberally construed
statute empowered federal courts to use remedial powers conferred in §
1964(a) for government actions to remedy private plaintiffs.14 The court
also suggested that Wollersheim relied too heavily on legislative history,
which the Supreme Court had interpreted as "a particularly thin reed"
explicit enforcement authority to both government and private litigants, "'it cannot be
assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies
for private citizens."' 796 F.2d at 1088 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981)). Without a strong indication of
congressional intent, the Court was not inclined to recognize new remedies not expressly
provided. Id. The Fifth Circuit in Dixie Carriers did not create new remedies. 843 F.2d
821 821 (5th Cir. 1988). The Eighth Circuit also has given deference to the Ninth Circuit,
but allowed for injunctive relief under pendant state claims. Airlines Reporting Corp. v.
Barry, 825 F.2d 1220, 1223 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987). However, "the Seventh Circuit recognized
the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have all expressed serious doubts about the
availability of injunctions in this setting." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Scheidler v.
Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler 1I), 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (No. 01-1118).
136. 267 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2001) overruled by 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (upholding the
district court's injunctive order against national anti-abortion action network). On
remand from the preliminary. issue of enterprise decided by the Supreme Court (in
Scheidler I), the case advanced to trial and a jury found the defendants guilty of extortion
under the Hobbs Act and state law extortion and awarded treble damages. Id. The
district court issued a nationwide injunction against the protest groups, which the Seventh





141. Id. at 697-98.
142. Id. at 698.
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for statutory interpretation. 43  Finally, Judge Wood undercut
Wollersheim's reliance on RICO and the Clayton Act.'" The Seventh
Circuit Scheidler ruling resulted in a clear circuit split over whether
injunctive relief was available to private plaintiffs under RICO.
45
D. The Ultimate Scheidler Holding
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Scheidler II to resolve the
circuit split over injunctive relief and to resolve RICO's implications for
protesters. 46 The Court considered only two of the questions presented
by the petitioners. The first was whether the activist group's
143. Id. at 699. Judge Wood quoted Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Scheidler 1,
which warned against judicial activism in interpreting RICO. Id. However. Chief Justice
Rehnquist was referring to courts inserting limitations into RICO that were not expressly
stated in the statute. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler I), 510 U.S.
249, 262 n.6 (1994). Judge Wood conversely was adding a remedy not expressly stated in
the statute. See NOW, 267 F.3d at 699.
144. NOW, 267 F.3d at 700. First, the court undercut the reliance on the Clayton Act
by suggesting that the parallels between the treble damages clause were where similarities
ended. Id. Second, the court explained that the Supreme Court now allows for private
injunctive relief under the Clayton scheme. Id.
145. See supra note 123. The Seventh Circuit Scheidler opinion also touched on two
highly contested issues: whether the First Amendment protected the actions and
prevented broad injunction of the anti-abortion coalition and whether the activities of the
coalition constituted "extortion" under the Hobbs Act. NOW, 267 F.3d at 700-03, 709.
The court noted that although political speech is fully protected by the First Amendment,
the government could regulate violent criminal conduct, even if the conduct involved
expressive elements. Id. at 702. Judge Wood cited a series of First Amendment cases that
refused to protect violent conduct from governmental regulation. Id. at 701-02. Judge
Wood opined that the protection of the plaintiffs' rights to provide medical care free of
violence and harassment were "important governmental interest[s]." Id. at 702. In light of
the evidence of threats, trespass, and destruction of property, the court determined that
the coalition's actions were outside the gambit of free speech protection. Id. The court
also rejected the defendant's argument that the acts were isolated incidents by certain
individuals, finding that the plaintiffs presented enough evidence to show that the entire
organization intended the illegal goals. Id. at 702-03. The defendants cited NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), which required plaintiffs to establish that
the organization intended the actions. Id. at 703. Judge Wood admitted that this test was
implicated, but rejected the argument, finding that the plaintiffs had met their burden to
show that the entire organization was involved in the actions, citing that the leaders were
those most involved in the violent activities. Id. Subsequently, Judge Wood rejected the
argument that the injunction was vague and overbroad, concluding that in some instances
the enjoined speech may be protected, but that the injunction was narrowly tailored to the
criminal violations of trespass, violence, or threats. Id. at 706. Finally, the court dismissed
argument that the Hobbs Act applied, claiming judicial precedent allowed for its
application as long as there is a loss to, or interference with, the rights of the victim. Id. at
709.
146. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler I1), 537 U.S. 393, 397 (2003).
147. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' First Amendment appeal. Id.
Compare id., with Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Scheidler II (No. 01-1118)
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interference with the abortion clinics qualified as a predicate act to
satisfy the racketeering element of RICO under the Hobbs Act's
definition of extortion.' 48 The second question was whether the Seventh
Circuit had the authority to grant a nationwide injunction under the civil
RICO provision.
149
The Supreme Court's ruling in Scheidler II sought to limit civil RICO
by outlining a more rigid definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act.""
The Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, determined that the meaning of
"extortion" under the Hobbs Act was based on the crime's common law
tradition, the New York Penal Code, and Field Code history. 5' The
Court defined "extortion" as obtaining the property of another, which
required that the defendant both deprive and acquire some property of
value."' The Court proposed that the protesters deprived the clinic of
property, but did not actually acquire its property. 53  Therefore, the
petitioners' conduct did not meet the requisite definition of extortion
under the Hobbs Act. 54 The Court thus held that the respondents failed
to meet the predicate act requirements to establish a RICO claim.155 As a
result, it reversed the Seventh Circuit and dismissed NOW's RICO
(petitioning the Court to hear the issue of whether the nationwide injunction against
PLAN complied with the First Amendment).
148. Scheidler 11, 537 U.S. at 397.
149. Id. Notably, the United States filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the
respondent's contention that the petitioners violated the Hobbs Act, but also supporting
the petitioners' contention that RICO did not allow a private plaintiff to seek an
injunction. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Scheidler II
(Nos. 01-1118, 01-1119). In its brief, the United States argued that allowing injunctive
relief was both contrary to the language of the statute and a dangerous policy. Id. at 6-7,
14. It maintained that allowing competing businesses the remedy under RICO was
contrary to the commerce-promoting nature of the Act because it had the potential to
cause "corporate death." Id. at 14.
150. Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 402-10. The Court ruled eight-to-one with Justice
Stevens writing a lone dissent. Id.
151. Id. at 402-04.
152. Id. at 404.
153. Id. at 405. The Court defined the behavior of the coalition as coercion, which is
not included in the Hobbs Act provision. Id. at 405-06. It noted that because coercion was
not specifically included as a predicate act for a RICO violation, the petitioners did not
meet the act requirement to constitute a RICO violation. Id. at 409. Craig M. Bradley
suggests an option that NOW could have pled that is closer to coercion: under the Hobbs
Act another RICO predicate offense is "interference with commerce" or criminal coercion
defined as "commit[ting] or threaten[ing] physical violence to person or property."
Political Protest, supra note 15, at 74.
154. Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 409. Furthermore, the Court found that the conduct did
not meet the requirements of extortion under Illinois state law. Id. Nor did the conduct
meet the requirements of extortion under the Travel Act. ld. at 410.
155. Id. at411.
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claim. 156  Because the Court determined that no underlying RICO
violation occurred, it declined to address the issue of injunctive relief.'57
Today, the issue remains unsettled by the Supreme Court.'
5
8
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF PRIVATE CIVIL RICO: DOES SCHEIDLER II
RESOLVE PROBLEMATIC ISSUES OF CIVIL RICO?
A. Scheidler Fails to Clarify the Expansive Definition of Racketeering
Unlike the line of cases leading up to Scheidler, all of which gave
strong deference to the liberal construction clause, 59 the Scheidler II
opinion gave rise to the Court's attempt to limit civil RICO."" In light of
the great division over the Act's complex and nuanced nature, the
Court's eight-to-one decision to dismiss the case was surprisingly non-
controversial. 6'  Although the Supreme Court clearly was concerned
with the private application to an organization involved in political
protest,' 62 the Court did not discuss the construction or interpretation of
156. Id. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence voiced concern over the application of RICO
to protesters and its general expansion, but reassured the pro-choice movement that
Congress had enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §
248 (1994), to deal with the issue. Id. at 411-12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
filed a lone dissent, arguing that extortion requires the acquisition of property but that the
acquired property need not be tangible. Id. at 412-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Steven's primary concern was the limitation of the Act's effectiveness against organized
crime where threats were made not to acquire property, but to drive another out of
business. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He feared the holding would reverse United
States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969), in which members of an organized crime
syndicate used verbal threats to corner the trash-hauling business, and to significantly
weaken criminal proceedings under RICO against the mob under the Hobbs Act. See
Scheidler It, 537 U.S. at 413; Political Protest, supra note 15, at 74.
157. Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 411.
158. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler I), 510 U.S. 249, 260-
61 (1994); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1985) United States v.
Turkette. 452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981).
160. See Scheidler 11, 537 U.S. at 412 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
161. Compare id. at 397-411, and id. at 411-12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), with id. at
412-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the decision for weakening RICO's strength to
combat organized crime with a narrower reading of extortion). The line of Supreme
Court Justices struggling with the broad language of the RICO statute and the liberal
interpretation clause exemplifies the conflicting approaches in defining the elements of
RICO and racketeering. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251-52
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the RICO statute is somewhat ambiguous in
its definition of racketeering); accord Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. See Oral Arguments at 25, Scheidler II (Nos. 01-1118, 01-1119) (raising the
question of whether RICO would have applied to civil rights protesters). Under both
NOW and the government's interpretation of civil RICO, the statute would have
implicated civil rights sit-ins in the 1960s. Cf Scheidler /. 510 U.S. at 263-64 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (setting the limits of RICO at the First Amendment).
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the elements of the RICO statute. Instead, the decision was limited in its
analysis to the predicate crime of extortion.6 This begs the question of
whether Scheidler II actually clarified the meaning of racketeering or if it
merely dispensed with the case before it. 
64
Although the holding of Scheidler II limits RICO's application under
the predicate act of extortion defined by Illinois state law and the Hobbs
Act, it does nothing to reduce those suits under other predicate act
provisions.' 6' Accordingly, experts suggest that the decision will not
significantly impede future racketeering actions against other protest166
groups. Plaintiffs still may use three potential predicate acts to
establish a RICO violation against protesters. First, plaintiffs may sue
under particular state statutes that define extortion without therequremnt f prpery .. . 167
requirement of property acquisition. Second, plaintiffs may utilize a
separate provision under the Hobbs Act for criminal interference with
commerce, which also does not require obtaining property, but simply an
interference with it. Finally, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 also may
163. Scheidler 11, 537 U.S. at 402-10.
164. See infra notes 165-177 and accompanying text.
165. See First Amendment, supra note 15, at 135; Political Protest, supra note 15, at 73-
74 (arguing that plaintiffs can use criminal coercion under the Hobbs Act or state
definitions of extortion, in the six states that do not require acquisition of property, to
bring civil RICO suits against protest groups); Levendosky, supra note 15 (suggesting that
the Patriot Act can serve as a predicate act allowing for civil RICO actions against anti-
government protesters).
166. See First Amendment, supra note 15, at 135; Political Protest, supra note 15, at 74;
Levendosky, supra note 15.
167. Political Protest, supra note 15, at 73-74. Six states define extortion as using
threats to deprive another of property, without the requirement of its acquisition. Id. at
73. In Scheidler I1, Justice Rehnquist used this definition to distinguish extortion from
coercion. 537 U.S. at 405-09. The Court characterized the anti-abortion protesters'
activity as merely depriving the clinics of the use of their property, and because the
protesters did not acquire any benefit, they simply were engaging in coercive behavior. Id.
at 405. Because one of RICO's predicate acts is extortion, as defined by state statutes, if
future plaintiffs bring suit in one of the six states that define extortion in this manner,
Justice Rehnquist's Scheidler II rationale will not apply and a plaintiff can establish a
prima facie racketeering activity. See Political Protest, supra note 15, at 74. Craig Bradley,
a criminal and constitutional law expert, argued that NOW poorly litigated its RICO claim
by failing to utilize the predicate act of criminal coercion and by bringing the suit in a state
where the statute defines extortion less stringently. Id. Justice Ginsburg's point that relief
to the clinics may be available under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of
1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248, also reveals the weakness of NOW's case. See Scheidler 11, 537 U.S.
at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Bradley suggested that NOW's error allowed the
Supreme Court to make a straightforward, non-controversial decision on extortion, and
noted that subsequent plaintiffs "would do well to avoid NOW's mistakes." Political
Protest, supra note 15, at 73-74.
168. First Amendment, supra note 15, at 142-43; Political Protest, supra note 15, at 74.
The Hobbs Act proscribes purposeful interference with commerce through commission or
threat of violence. Hobbs Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000). Section 1951(a) states:
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implicate protesters through its broad definition of terrorism, which
includes a prohibition of threatening or violent activities meant to coerce
the government to act. 69
Those satisfied by the Supreme Court's outcome may argue that its
tone and willingness to limit the predicate act of extortion could prevent
future cases or encourage the federal courts to interpret RICO's
predicate acts more restrictively.' 70 Another argument suggests that the
Court's willingness to limit this predicate act may communicate to
Congress the need to amend RICO. 7 ' However, the fact that Scheidler II
did not comment on the scope of RICO and only analyzed the predicate
act of extortion weakens these arguments. Justice Rehnquist framed
the opinion as an extortion case and discussed RICO simply to provide
background and to suggest that the state crime of coercion was omitted
from the statute.' 7' The message from the Supreme Court suggests that
the elements of extortion were not properly met under these
circumstances, and that the Court will analyze each predicate act on a
case-by-case basis when the outcome appears unsatisfactory to the
Court.7 4  Because Scheidler II only reviewed the narrow issue of
extortion and failed to address the structure of RICO or other predicate
acts that may implicate protesters, the decision ultimately failed to
prevent future civil RICO litigation involving political protest groups.5
Furthermore, in light of federalism and constitutional concerns over
RICO's reach, the decision will not correct inherent flaws in the
statute. 1 6 By failing to elucidate these issues or to direct congressional
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce ... or commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to
do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
Id. Professor Craig Bradley argues that criminal coercion is a separate crime from
criminal extortion under the Hobbs Act, which was originally intended to protect the war
effort from industry or railroad saboteurs during World War I. First Amendment, supra
note 15, at 142-43.
169. See Levendosky, supra note 15.
170. See Scheidler 11, 537 U.S. at 412-13, 417 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
the Court's opinion limiting the definition of property may limit RICO enforcement in
useful areas).
171. Oestreicher, supra note 85, at 717-19.
172. See Scheidler 11, 537 U.S. at 397-411.
173. Id. at 397, 405-07. Contra Political Protest, supra note 15, at 73-74 (arguing that
interference with commerce actually was included in the statute as a form of coercion).
174. See Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 402-05 (providing a detailed analysis of the history
and correct meaning of extortion).
175. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
176. See Oestreicher, supra note 85, at 723-26.
1150 [Vol. 53:1125
RICO's Scope and Remedies Require Reevaluation
attention to the inherent problems with the statute, the Court left the
door open for plaintiffs who will continue to test RICO's boundaries.1
7
B. Scheidler Fails to Address Private Injunctive Relief and the Resulting
Constitutional and Application Issues
Scheidler not only failed to clarify the racketeering requirement, but it
also failed to resolve the availability of injunctive relief." Upon
determining that no underlying RICO claim existed, the Court dismissed
the action, stating that it "need not address" the issue of injunctive
relief. 7 9 Since the Ninth Circuit decided Wollersheim in 1986, federal
courts have generally followed its prohibition of injunctive relief to
private civil RICO claimants, with the exception of pendant state claims,
which do provide for injunctive relief.""' Due to its contradictory reading
of the statute and rejection of Wollersheim, the Seventh Circuit Scheidler
opinion created a need for Supreme Court review.'' With such
uncertainty regarding the elements of the RICO private action,' 2
determining the scope of available remedies to private litigants virtually
ensures forum shopping, uncertain pleading, and issues of constitutional
183
vagueness.
On a practical level, injunctive relief serves as an important weapon for
plaintiffs in many types of RICO actions. 84 RICO plaintiffs often use
injunctions to induce large settlements, well beyond alleged damages,
and to eliminate competitors."" Scheidler illustrates that injunctions also
prove useful in halting alleged racketeering activities of non-
economically motivated enterprises."'" However, the Court's
177. See Political Protest, supra note 15, at 74 (positing that protesters can still be
charged as racketeers under other RICO predicate acts).
178. See Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 411.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Scheidler II (No. 01-1118).
181. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 1986)
(barring injunctive relief to private plaintiffs), and Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. Channel Fueling
Serv. (In re Fredeman Litig.), 843 F.2d 821, 828 (5th Cir. 1988), with Nat'l Org. for
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (NOW), 267 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding the district
court's injunctive order against national anti-abortion action network), overruled by 537
U.S. 393 (2003).
182. See supra Parts I.A-B.
183. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
184. See Blakely & Cessar, supra note 12, at 533 (suggesting injunctive relief can be
used to fill gaps against terrorism, white-collar crime, political corruption, and hate-group
prosecution).
185. See DOCKET REPORT, supra note 15 (explaining that the question of RICO
injunctive relief is of particular interest to many businesses because it can be used to
harass business competitors).
186. See NOW, 267 F.3d at 695.
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unrestrained interpretations, which extend injunctive relief to private
plaintiffs, may implicate constitutional concerns, especially when applied
to organizations with political motives.8 7 The district court's nationwide
injunction against anti-abortion protesters in Scheidler exemplifies the
danger of this remedy." " In this context, several commentators and
judges raised concerns regarding RICO's injunctive remedies'
infringement on First Amendment freedoms. 9 While private injunctive
relief may compensate some plaintiffs when monetary damages fail to
fully remedy,'90 injunctive power under RICO clearly has the potential to
cause substantial mischief.'9'
The specific omission of private injunctive relief sharply differs from
the other uncertainties of the RICO statute regarding enterprise or
patterns of racketeering.'92 Congress provided private plaintiffs only with
the express statutory remedy of treble damages and attorneys' fees.' 93
The Wollersheim court reasoned that a federal court could only allow the
express remedies because Congress considered and omitted injunctive
relief. 194 The Seventh Circuit Scheidler opinion gave an opposite reading,
ruling that the grant of injunctive relief to federal courts for federal
prosecutorial hearings extended a parallel grant to civil litigants.'99
Without resolution of this circuit split in Scheidler H, application of civil
RICO remains uncertain. 96 The Supreme Court has provided no clear
187. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler 1), 510 U.S. 249, 263 (1994)
(Souter, J., concurring) (discussing whether some "racketeering" activities may be fully
protected by the First Amendment); Levendosky, supra note 15 (suggesting that anti-
government protesters may be enjoined by participating in supposed racketeering
activity); see also supra note 118.
188. See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler 11), 537 U.S. 393, 411
(2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Scheidler I, 510 U.S. at 267 (Souter, J., concurring).
189. See, e.g., Political Protest, supra note 15, at 74; Barry, supra note 118, at 909-16
(suggesting the broad statute and availability of broad relief implicate symbolic speech and
prior restraint); Levendosky, supra note 15; First Amendment, supra note 15, at 135; supra
note 118.
190. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1089 (9th Cir. 1986);
Blakely & Cessar, supra note 12, at 533.
191. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Scheidler I (No. 01-1118); supra notes
15, 118.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000); see also Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1084-85 (citing
Sedima, which stated the Senate intended to limit injunctive remedies to §§ 1964(a), (b),
and (d)); supra note 135.
193. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
194. 796 F.2d at 1081-89.
195. 267 F.3d 687, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2001), overruled by 537 U.S. 393 (2003). Judge
Wood also rejected Wollersheim's reliance on legislative history. Id. at 697.
196. See Political Protest, supra note 15, at 73-74 (suggesting that there remain issues
of RICO for the court to address). Because district court judges must follow different
precedents, this will encourage RICO plaintiffs to shop for forums where the law favors
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decision on the issue of injunctive relief, nor has the Court extended the
suggestion to Congress that civil RICO requires more definition. '9' As a
result, plaintiffs will continue to turn to RICO and the federal courts for
new and creative racketeering claims and remedies.'9"
III. BOTH THE COURTS AND CONGRESS MUST REEXAMINE CIVIL RICO
Due to the uncertainty regarding the application of private civil RICO,
the issues that Scheidler II left unresolved will likely return to the
Supreme Court.' 9  In the future, two suggestions will aid judges and
practitioners in better understanding the RICO scheme: (1) barring the
availability of injunctive relief to private litigants; and (2) amending the
statute to remove the civil provision.
A. The Court Should Resolve the Circuit Split and Bar Injunctive Relief
to Private RICO Litigants
1. Courts Have Authority to Address the Issue of Injunction
The role of the courts in limiting RICO raises separation of powers
problems because courts lack the authority to change acts of Congress.2 "
In the line of RICO Supreme Court cases, Justices repeatedly noted that
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limited judicial review of RICO.2 2
injunction. Id. As a result of different laws in different federal courts, enforcement issues
arise over injunctive relief. See Amicus Brief of Life Legal Defense Foundation in
Support of Petitioners at 12, Scheidler II (Nos. 01-1118, 01-1119). Furthermore, because
many circuits and districts fail to recognize its availability, the Seventh Circuit would have
had difficulties enforcing a nationwide injunction in the Ninth Circuit if the injunction was
upheld. Id.
197. See, e.g., Scheidler 11, 537 U.S. at 400-11 (failing to address the issue of injunctive
relief or the issue of RICO construction).
198. See Roggow, supra note 26, at 600-02 (arguing that the broad interpretation of
civil RICO will encourage plaintiffs to find creative ways to achieve the fruits of
federalized crimes).
199. See Scheidler 11, 537 U.S. at 411; see also First Amendment, supra note 15, at 135;
Political Protest, supra note 15, at 74.
200. See infra Parts III.A-B.
201. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (stating that the judicial power shall extend to
cases and controversies), with id. art. I, § 1 (stating that all legislative powers are vested in
Congress). The Supreme Court has hesitated to legislate by reading into a statute
limitations that Congress did not intend. See, e.g., Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler
(Scheidler I), 510 U.S. 249, 261 (1994); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 245 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-500 (1985).
202. See, e.g., Scheidler I, 510 U.S. at 261 (suggesting that courts should be wary to
read limitations into RICO that do not comport with its language); Northwestern Bell, 492
U.S. at 245 (rejecting Court imposed non-textual limits to RICO because it is not the
Court's duty to rewrite the statute); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (suggesting that the defects of
RICO are "inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress").
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Many aspects of RICO lie outside the scope of judicial authority to
impose limitations, and properly should be left for Congress to address.0 3
The issue of injunctive relief, however, falls within the powers of the
federal judiciary to say "what the law is. ' '2"4 Two concerns support this
premise: first, injunction differs from the other structural elements of
RICO that federal courts have addressed; and second, injunction falls
205
within the discretion of a court interpreting RICO. Injunction differs
from other elements of RICO because Congress clearly omitted the
remedy when it added the civil provision.2 " Therefore, rather than
abridge substantive elements of the racketeering crime by inserting
limitations in order to grant an injunction, as Sedima, Northwestern Bell,
Turkette and Scheidler I all rejected, a judge must extend the provision
207beyond its express language. Additionally, the remedy of injunction in
essence lies within the discretionary power of federal courts under the
RICO scheme.20' Even if the Seventh Circuit was correct in finding a
parallel grant of injunctive relief, other federal circuits could still limit
the authority of the district courts to issue injunctions.9 The federal
courts have exercised this discretion previously in relation to the Clayton
Act.2 0 Thus, the judiciary has the inherent authority to clarify the issue
Indeed, the struggle of federal court judicial review of legislation is no more evident than
in the Court's handling of RICO and the liberal interpretation clause. Compare Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (explaining that "[it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"), with Scheidler 1, 510
U.S. at 261; Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 245; and Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-500. The
Marbury Court also said that "[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule." 5 U.S (1 Cranch) at 177.
203. See supra notes 57, 200-01 and accompanying text.
204. Compare Scheidler 1, 510 U.S. at 261, Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 245, and
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-500 (suggesting that the powers of judicial review are limited with
respect to statutory elements) with Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1080-84 (referring to the
legislative history to decide injunctive relief) and Blakely & Cessar, supra note 12, at 557-
61 (suggesting that courts should use the canons of statutory construction to hold that
injunctive relief is available).
205. See Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1080-84.
206. Id. at 1080-85.
207. See supra notes 121, 135 and accompanying text.
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000) (providing district courts the power to use
equitable remedies, including injunction, in government enforcement actions when
"appropriate").
209. See, e.g., id. This would imply that the courts have authority to determine
whether relief was available in civil contexts. See id. However, the strongest means of
settling the issue would be for Congress to amend the statute to provide a clearer
understanding. See infra Part III.B.
210. See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 170, 188-89 (1997) (interpreting the
injunctive relief element of the Clayton Act); see also Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler (NOW), 267 F.3d 687, 700 (7th Cir. 2001) (referring to the fact that the Supreme
Court decided the injunctive relief issue under the Clayton Act), overruled by 537 U.S. 393
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of injunction without overstepping the boundaries of separation of
211powers.
2. The Statutory Language Bars Injunctive Relief and Serves Both
Political and Practical Functions
The Supreme Court could have barred injunctive relief to civil litigants
212in Scheidler II. However, the Supreme Court determined that the
outcome depended on the extortion issue, and therefore a ruling on
injunction would have been dicta.2 3 Once the Court ruled on the least
controversial theory to dismiss the case, the issue of injunction became
moot.
214
When the issue returns, the Court should bar injunctive relief to
private plaintiffs under civil RICO.2"5 The Constitution and rules of
interpretation limit the authority of federal courts to provide remedies
• - • 216
under a statute, especially for an injunction. The availability of
injunctive relief in federal actions does not necessitate the parallel
inclusion of it in civil actions as the Seventh Circuit suggested.217
Congress provided specific and powerful civil remedies through treble
(2003); California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 287-96 (1990); discussion supra note
135.
211. See discussion supra Part III.A.I.
212. See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler II), 537 U.S. 393, 397
(2003).
213. See id. (deciding that the injunction issue is moot because there is no underlying
RICO violation); Political Protest, supra note 15, at 74 (suggesting that the Court will
likely see other cases like Scheidler).
214. Scheidler I1, 537 U.S. at 411.
215. See infra notes 216-241 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20
(1979) (suggesting that courts must be wary of reading new judicial remedies into federal
statutes).
217. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-14, Scheidler II (Nos. 01-1118,
01-1119). The government's brief stated:
The court of appeals' interpretation is also undermined by its recognition ... that
Section 1964(b) grants only the government the right to seek preliminary
injunctive relief. Under the court of appeals' reading of the statute, private
parties may seek permanent injunctive relief but not temporary relief pending
final resolution of their claims. There is no reason, however, why Congress
would have intended that highly anomalous result. Rather, the logical
interpretation of the statute is that Congress created a symmetrical statutory
scheme under which the Attorney General may seek temporary and final
injunctive relief, and private parties may seek treble damages.
Id. at 8. The Wollersheim court similarly rejected the parallel grant theory because the
civil provision in § 1964(c) was added later with its own specific remedy after
consideration of inserting injunction into the civil clause. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1082-86 (9th Cir. 1986).
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damages and attorneys' fees."" Without any specific language in the
statute suggesting private injunctive relief, the Wollersheim court's
consideration of the legislative history, rather than the extension of the
remedy under the liberal construction clause, was an appropriate means
of determining congressional intent.2 ' 9  Both the House and Senate
rejected proposals to insert a private injunctive remedy into the civil
provision.22  This provides a strong indication that Congress did not
intend to make equitable relief available to private plaintiffs.2 2' Finally,
as the United States argued in Scheidler II, the basic purpose of RICO
remains consistent with the preclusion of injunctive relief in all actions
222
except for those that the Attorney General prosecutes.
Aside from the statutory limitation, three practical and political
reasons support barring injunctive relief under civil RICO. 22' First,
RICO plaintiffs will not suffer great hardship without injunction because
they have alternative means to protect against injury to property or
224business.. All of the predicate acts under RICO are state crimes,
federal crimes, or common law causes of action that can aid in righting
any wrongs caused by a racketeering injury.225 Congress did not intend
for the statute to serve as a catch-all provision, but rather to prevent
221
racketeering crimes from infiltrating the economy. If an individual
suffers injury to business or property through a RICO violation, that
individual has the opportunity to collect treble damages and attorneys'
fees, which is a generous reward.227 If insufficient, the individual retains- 221'
the full array of common law and state statutory remedies. Ultimately,
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
219. See Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1082-84 (holding that the grant of a specific remedy
coupled with silence regarding another precludes the availability of the unstated remedy).
220. Id. at 1084-86.
221. See id.
222. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Scheidler II (Nos. 01-1118, 01-
1119). The United States' brief suggests that providing injunctive relief to private citizens
may encourage "corporate death" at the hands of private litigants, a result the statutory
scheme did not intend. Id. Furthermore, the United States cited the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, which provides private injunctive relief, to suggest that
Congress will expressly provide for the specific remedy in the statute when intended. Id.
at 14-15.
223. See infra notes 224-39 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (providing treble damages and attorneys' fees
to parties injured in their business or property by racketeers).
225. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500-01 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that civil RICO federalizes areas of criminal law traditionally
associated with states).
226. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
228. See id. § 1961(a).
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even if every plaintiff does not obtain a remedy, this is an unfortunate
consequence of a statutory scheme that does not support a private civil
injunctive remedy.2
Second, although barring injunctive relief will not resolve all the
uncertainties of civil RICO suits,23 it will add some clarity.2 3t It would
discourage actions against non-economically motivated groups
• 232
prosecuted under even the most liberal interpretation of racketeering.
It also will ease the potentially chilling effects on free speech that arise
from the extension of RICO to political protest groups,233 and will
234prevent problems arising from federalism challenges to the statute.
Furthermore, because judicial review precludes courts from inserting
limits, barring injunctive relief effectively clarifies the statute without
overstepping the boundaries of judicial interpretation.239
Finally, barring injunctive relief will promote Congress' political and
practical intent.2 6 Federal prosecutors, as opposed to private parties, are
more likely to utilize discretion when enforcing RICO because they do
229. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1986).
230. See supra notes 11, 15 (explaining that issues of application, including a clear
definition of racketeering, remain unresolved).
231. See JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 20(a) (discussing the various federal court
interpretations of injunctive relief).
232. See Amicus Brief of Life Legal Defense Fund Foundation In Support of
Petitioners at 6-9, Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler II), 537 U.S. 393
(2003) (Nos. 01-1118, 01-1119).
233. See Brief for the States of Alabama, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota,
and Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 7, Scheidler If (Nos. 01-1118, 01-1119). The States argued:
[Tihe addition of private injunctive remedies to the already powerful treble
damages available to private persons is neither desirable "as a policy matter" nor
in furtherance of "Congress' goal." The application of civil RICO to political or
social protest activities has a substantial chilling effect on protected First
Amendment activity. Adding injunctive remedies . . . would only lower the
temperature further.
Id.; see also supra note 118.
234. See Oestreicher, supra note 85, at 711-13 (suggesting that the most problematic
RICO claims for federalism charges are the non-economically motivated intra-state petty
offenses).
235. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the Court was limited in its ability to construe the statute by
its proper role as the judiciary and by the question presented); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985) (rejecting the lower court's "discovery" of limitations
when the RICO statute implicates legitimate businesses); see also supra Part III.A.1; cf
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1993) (explaining that the Court must
determine boundaries of congressional purpose and limit the liberal construction clause).
236. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Scheidler If (Nos. 01-
1118, 01-1119) (arguing that restricting the availability of injunctive relief and equitable
remedies to government actions promotes public policy and congressional intent).
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not stand to receive a personal benefit.3 7 Injunctive relief in the hands of
private litigants risks harm to the American economy if courts allow
businesses to enjoin their competitors or force them into exorbitant
settlements. 238 In seeking to prevent infiltration of legitimate businesses
by corrupt organizations, Congress did not intend for RICO to restrict
business, which is an unfortunate economic consequence of injunction.2 9
Barring this remedy will promote business and competition-long
hampered by improper application of RICO-and will promote properly
prosecuted RICO actions by the government. 24" Although some critics
suggest RICO as a blanket remedy for many societal problems, limiting
the availability of RICO remedies to its statutory mandate will
encourage Congress to address these problems with more detailed
legislation.4
B. Congress Should Amend RICO to Remove the Civil Provision
Although barring injunctive relief will provide for a clearer
understanding of RICO's remedies, Congress, rather than the judiciary,
is best suited and ultimately responsible for clarifying RICO. 242 Congress
should amend RICO to strike, or significantly narrow, the civil provision
for two reasons. First, practical application reveals that the civil
243provision no longer serves its purpose. Second, the provision is marred
244by two constitutional flaws.
Even after Scheidler, the civil RICO provision remains too broad to
serve its initial purpose. 24' As courts continue in their struggle to
237. See id. at 14.
238. See supra notes 16, 149 and accompanying text.
239. Compare supra notes 16, 149 (suggesting that injunctions sought by businesses
against competitors harm economic growth by enjoining profitable activities and forcing
settlements), with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (stating the goals of civil RICO to prevent
economic detriment to business or property from infiltration of the legitimate business
community by organized crime).
240. See supra notes 16, 149 and accompanying text.
241. Compare supra note 14 (suggesting RICO's extension to provide remedies for
various problems), with supra notes 52, 70, and 85 (suggesting that broad federalization of
crime in vague terms may create a constitutional problem).
242. See supra Part III.A.
243. Compare supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of RICO).
with notes 9, 57 and accompanying text (explaining that the current use of RICO extends
beyond the traditional notions of organized crime).
244. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
245. Compare supra note 9 (noting the broad application of civil RICO to areas not
typically associated with organized crime), with supra note 56 (noting the difficulties the
courts have in interpreting RICO's broad language), and supra note 70 (explaining that
RICO was never intended to be interpreted so broadly, particularly in light of the limiting
principles of federalism). Several Justices and commentators suggest that the reason for
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246interpret the provision, plaintiffs continue to seek new applications.
Plaintiffs bring numerous RICO private actions, most often against
legitimate businesses or organizations, scarring the businesses with a
negative reputation as racketeers.2 47 As a result, the overcrowded federal
courts must bear the burden of an enormous RICO caseload that hinders
248the flow of commerce. It is clear that the practical application of civil
RICO has not been to weaken criminal organizations, but rather to
create mountains of federal litigation and novel approaches to establish a
"racketeering suit. In the narrow avenue of combating organized
crime, RICO may actually serve a useful purpose.'s° The civil gap-filling
291provision, however, has clearly failed.
Furthermore, the expansion of RICO also creates constitutional
issues. 25' The statute extends federal criminal law beyond any federal
statute before it."' The vague, quasi-criminal, quasi-civil provision
revolutionizes federal litigation and creates jurisdictional problems that
usurp state authority.254 The shift towards more judicial scrutiny in
commerce-clause jurisprudence, as well as the extension of civil RICO to
non-economically motivated enterprises, signals a call for Congress to
219
roll back RICO's extensive regulations.
Another constitutional issue arises because RICO application to




Although RICO prohibits only criminal actions outside the scope of the
First Amendment, its loose association-in-fact requirement, vague and
RICO's failure to serve its purpose is that the statute is too vague and overreaching. See
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 8, 9 and accompanying text.
248. See Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 8-10 (suggesting that civil RICO congests the
federal courts with state justiciable claims); see also supra notes 16, 238-40 and
accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 8, 9, and 198 and accompanying text.
250. Kurzweil, supra note 60, at 56 n.85. RICO has become a popular and effective
prosecutorial tool. Id.; see also Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. (Scheidler II), 537
U.S. 393, 416-17 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that limiting predicate acts
may limit the usefulness of the criminal provision).
251. See Oestreicher, supra note 85, at 718 (stating that Congress knows the civil
provision is dysfunctional); see also supra notes 9, 10, 15, 52, 56, 85.
252. See supra notes 70, 85 and accompanying text.
253. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 247-54.
254. See supra notes 52, 70, 85.
255. Oestreicher, supra note 85, at 717-20; see also supra notes 52, 70, 85.
256. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text; see also Roth, supra note 118, at
488 ("This showdown between RICO and the First Amendment may be avoided if
Congress heeds the common cry to safeguard groups whose primary purpose is exchange
in the marketplace of ideas from RICO liability.").
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extremely broad definition of racketeering, and strong but undefined
remedies, all serve to chill constitutionally protected freedoms.257
Allowing broad application to parties with particular interests threatens
to harm the participation and association of political organizations.""6 It
also precludes groups from engaging in forms of protest that involve civil
disobedience, a core American value.9
If Congress' intent in drafting RICO was to prevent the infiltration of
the legitimate business community by organized crime, then it should
have tailored a statute to effectively serve that end.26 " Civil RICO's
unrestrained application contradicts its original intent, and it contains
dangerous constitutional deficiencies.26  It is time for Congress to clarify
RICO by removing the civil provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
Due to civil RICO's ambiguous construction, mandate for liberal
interpretation, and attractive remedies, plaintiffs have flooded the
federal courts with suits against businesses and organizations not
associated with organized crime. As illustrated by Scheidler I, the failure
of the courts and Congress to clearly define RICO raises dangerous
., 262
constitutional and practical application problems. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court's resolution of Scheidler II fails to clarify RICO's
application or its remedies. In future cases, the Court should bar
injunctive relief under the civil provision to prevent these many recurring
issues. This would provide the correct statutory interpretation, fall
within the scope of judicial review, and find support in practical and
policy rationales. Although Court efforts to limit RICO through
injunctive relief would mark a sufficient starting point, Congress
ultimately bears the responsibility to amend and cure RICO. 261 Congress
should use this authority to remove RICO's civil provision.
257. See Parker, supra note 118, at 830-48 (arguing that Congress must amend RICO
because its broad definition of racketeering and extension of its requirements sets up
future problems of infringing on political speech).
258. See supra notes 15, 118 and accompanying text.
259. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Love, Law, and Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 217 (David R. Weber ed.,
1978) ("Our nation in a sense came into being through a massive act of civil disobedience,
for the Boston Tea Party was nothing but a massive act of civil disobedience.").
260. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 253-54; see also Parker, supra note 118, at 847-48.
261. See supra notes 234-50 and accompanying text.
262. See supra Parts II -II.
263. See supra Part III.B.
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